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The US must not misread a desperate, cornered Iran

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by Erfan Fard, opinion contributor - 05/20/26 8:00 AM ET

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by Erfan Fard, opinion contributor - 05/20/26 8:00 AM ET

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AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

People walk past a mural depicting a U.S. aircraft carrier under missile attack in downtown Tehran, Iran on Sunday.

For years, Washington has tended to view Iran as a patient strategic rival, a regime steadily extending its influence across the Middle East through terrorist proxies, asymmetric pressure, and ideological resolve. But that familiar frame may now be obscuring a more dangerous reality: Iran’s conduct increasingly reflects desperation, not confidence.

That distinction matters. Governments under sustained internal and external pressure often become more coercive, less predictable, and more willing to take risks. If Washington continues to read Iran as a stable revisionist power rather than an insecure regime increasingly focused on survival, it may misjudge the threat in ways that carry real consequences.

Recent Iranian behavior across the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Lebanon and beyond points to a leadership preoccupied with preserving control at home and deterring pressure abroad. Tehran still presents itself as a revolutionary power capable of shaping the region, but many of its choices today resemble actions of a state trying to manage vulnerability, not project strength.

One place this is especially visible is the Strait of Hormuz and the broader Persian Gulf. Iranian officials frequently cast pressure on maritime traffic in the language of security, regulation, or economic necessity. Yet the practical effect is familiar: coercion through instability. Tehran creates risk, then seeks to present itself as one of the few actors able to contain it. Without formally declaring war or imposing an official blockade, the regime relies on intimidation, legal ambiguity, and psychological pressure to increase the costs of confrontation for governments and global markets alike.

Iran also avoids direct conventional confrontation with the U.S. whenever possible. Instead, it relies on calibrated ambiguity — proxy pressure, maritime disruption, cyber activity, psychological signaling, and regional intimidation — to impose costs while staying below the threshold of open war.

These tools can be effective. But their growing centrality may reveal constraint as much as confidence. Tehran increasingly behaves like a government trying to compensate for structural weakness through asymmetric disruption.

The same pattern appears in Iran’s economy, now under severe strain from sanctions, inflation, corruption, capital flight and long-term mismanagement. Tehran’s deeper reliance on China, Russia, and alternative trade routes through Iraq, Pakistan, and Asian logistical networks is often framed domestically as proof of resilience. More often, it reflects a narrowing of options. Economies dependent on sanctions evasion, opaque financial systems, and regional smuggling networks are rarely strategically healthy.

That is especially striking for a regime whose foreign policy is built on the slogan “Neither East nor West.” Today, Iran depends heavily on Eastern powers for economic breathing room, diplomatic cover, and strategic coordination. China and Russia may help reduce its isolation, but neither can solve the Islamic Republic’s underlying domestic problems. Nor can they restore the regime’s declining legitimacy at home.

Those pressures are visible inside Iran as well. The government continues to face public frustration and social exhaustion after years of economic deterioration, political repression, and recurring unrest. Iranian officials still frame hardship and repression as part of a broader national struggle against foreign pressure. But although that narrative remains useful, it is wearing thin, particularly among younger generations increasingly disconnected from the state’s ideological foundations.

The Islamic Republic also relies heavily on regional proxy groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. These organizations provide Tehran strategic depth and asymmetric deterrence. They also help externalize pressure by keeping multiple fronts active beyond Iran’s own borders. Tehran understands that losing influence across the region could shift political and security pressure back toward the Iranian interior.

That creates a central contradiction in Iran’s regional posture. The regime portrays itself as a guarantor of stability while simultaneously supporting armed actors that many neighboring states view as destabilizing. From Tehran’s perspective, these policies may be defensive and necessary for regime preservation. From Washington’s perspective, they increase v